Abstract. We consider bilevel pseudomonotone equilibrium problems. We use a penalty function to convert a bilevel problem into one-level ones. We generalize a pseudo ∇-monotonicity concept from ∇-monotonicity and prove that under pseudo ∇-monotonicity property any stationary point of a regularized gap function is a solution of the penalized equilibrium problem. As an application, we discuss a special case that arises from the Tikhonov regularization method for pseudo monotone equilibrium problems.
Introduction
Let C be a nonempty closed convex subset in R n and f, g : C × C → R be two bifunctions satisfying f (x, x) = g(x, x) = 0 for every x ∈ C. Such a bifunction is called an equilibrium bifunction. We consider the following bilevel equilibrium problem (BEP for short):
Findx ∈ S g such that f (x, y) ≥ 0, ∀y ∈ S g , (1.1)
where S g = {u ∈ C : g(u, y) ≥ 0, ∀y ∈ C} i.e.. S g is the solution set of the equilibrium problem
Find u ∈ C such that g(u, y) ≥ 0, ∀y ∈ C. (1.2)
As usual, we call problem ( 1.1) the upper problem and ( 1.2) the lower one. BEPs are special cases of mathematical programs with equilibrium constraints. Sources for such problems can be found in [13, 14, 20] . Bilevel monotone variational inequality, which is a special case of problem ( 1.1) was considered in [1, 11] . Moudafi in [18] suggested the use of the proximal point method for monotone BEPs. Recently, Ding in [9] used the auxiliary problem principle to BEPs. In both papers, the bifunctions f and g are required to be monotone on C. It should be noticed that under the pseudomonotonicity assumption on g the solution-set S g of the lower problem ( 1.2) is a closed convex set whenever g(x, .) is lower seminoutinuous and convex on C for each x. However, the main difficulty is that, even the constrained set S g is convex, it is not given explicitly as in a standard mathematical programming problem, and therefore the available methods (see e.g. [4, 7, 15, 16, 21, 22, 24] and the references therein) cannot be applied directly. In this paper, first, we propose a penalty function method for Problem ( 1.1). Next, we use a regularized gap function for solving the penalized problems. Under certain pseudo ∇-monotonicity properties of the regularized bifunction we show that any stationary point of the gap function on the convex set C is a solution to the penalized subproblem. Finally, we apply the proposed method to the Tikhonov regularization method for pseudomonotone equilibrium problems.
A Penalty Function Method
Penalty function method is a fundamental tool widely used in optimization to convert a constrained problem into unconstraint (or easier constrained) ones. This method was used to monotone variational inequalities in [11] and equilibrium problems in [19] . In this section we use the penalty function method to the bilevel problem ( 1.1). First, let us recall some well-known concepts on monotonicity and continuity (see e.g. [5] ) that will be used in the sequel.
Definition 2.1
The bifunction φ : C × C → R is said to be: a) strongly monotone on C with modulus β > 0 if
d) upper-semicontiniuos at x with respect to the first argument on C if
e) lower-semicontiniuos at y with respect to the second argument on C if
Clearly, a) =⇒ b) =⇒ c).
Definition 2.2 ( [6])
The bifunction φ : C × C → R is said to be coercive on C if there exists a compact subset B ⊂ IR n and a vector y 0 ∈ B ∩ C such that
Theorem 2.1 ([12] Proposition 2.1.14 ) Let φ : C × C → R be a equilibrium bifunction such that φ(., y) is upper semicontinuous on C for each y ∈ C and φ(x, .) is convex on C for each x ∈ C. Suppose that C is compact or φ is coercive on C, then there exists at least one x * ∈ C such that φ(x * , y) ≥ 0 for every y ∈ C.
The following theorem tell us a relationship between the coercivity and the strong monotonicity.
Proposition 2.1 Suppose that the equilibrium bifunction φ is strongly monotone on C, and φ(x, .) is convex, lower-semicontinuous with respect to the second argument, then for each y ∈ C there exists a compact set B such that y ∈ B and φ(x, y) < 0 ∀x ∈ C \ B.
Proof, Suppose contradiction that the conclusion of the theorem does not hold. Then there exists an element y 0 ∈ C such that for every closed ball B r centered at the origin with radius r > ||y 0 ||, there is an element x r ∈ C \ B r such that φ(x r , y 0 ) ≥ 0. Fix r 0 > ||y 0 || and r 0 > 1. Take x r = y 0 + r(x − y 0 ), where r > r 0 , x ∈ C ∩ B r 0 . By the strong monotonicity of φ, we have
Since φ(y 0 , .) is convex on C, it follows that
However, since φ(y 0 , .) is lower semicontinuous on C, by the well-known Weierstrass Theorem, φ(y 0 , .) attains its minimum on the compact set B r 0 ∩ C. This fact contradicts to (1) . 2
From this proposition we can derive the following corallaries.
Corollary 2.1 ( [12] ) If bifunction φ is strongly monotone on C, and φ(x, .) is convex, lower-semicontinuous with respect to the second argument, then φ is coercive on C.
Corollary 2.2 Suppose that bifunction f is strongly monotone on C, and f (x, .) is convex, lower-semicontinuous with respect to the second argument. If the bifunction g is coercive on C then, for every > 0, the bifunction g + f is uniformly coercive on C e.g.., there exists a point y 0 ∈ C and a compact set B both independent of such that
Proof. From the coercivity of g we conclude that there exists a compact B 1 and y 0 ∈ C such that g(x, y 0 ) < 0 ∀x ∈ C \ B 1 . Since f is strongly monotone, convex, lower semicontinuous on C, by choosing y = y 0 , from Proposition 2.1, there exists a compact
Remark 2.1 It is worth to note that, if both f , g are coercive and pseudomonotone on C, then the function f + g are not necessary coercive or pseudomonotone on C To see this, let us consider the following bifunctions
Then we have i) f (x, y), g(x, y) are pseudomonotone and coercive on C; ii) ∀ > 0 the bifunctions f (x, y) = g(x, y) + f (x, y) are neither pseudomonotone nor coercive on C.
1 e x 1 < 0 ∀y ∈ C \B, which means that f is coercive on C. Similarly, we can see that g is coercive on C ii) By definition of f we have
2 (e t − e 2t ) > 0 for t is sufficiently large. So f is not pseudomonotone on C.
Now we show that the bifunction
is not coercive on C. Suppose, by contradiction, that there exist a compact set B and
Then, by coercivity of f , it follows y , then, from 1 < k < 10 follows x(t) ∈ C and f (x(t), y 0 ) > 0 for t is sufficiently large, which contradicts with coercivity.
-If y < k < 1 we obtain x(t) ∈ C and f (x(t), y 0 ) > 0 for t is large enough. But this can not be happened because of the coercivity of f . Now, for each fixed > 0, we consider the penalized equilibrium problem P EP (C, f ) defined as
By SOL(C, f ) we denote the solution-set of P EP (C, f ).
Theorem 2.2
Suppose that the equilibrium bifunctions f, g are pseudomonotone, upper semicontinuous with respect to the first argument and lower semicontinuous, convex with respect to the second argument on C. Then any cluster point of the sequence {x k } with x k ∈ SOL(C, f k ), k → 0 is a solution to the original bilevel problem. In addition, if f is strongly monotone and g is coercive on C, then for each k > 0 the penalized problem P EP (C, f k ) is solvable and any sequence {x k } with x k ∈ SOL(C, f k ) converges to the unique solution of the bilevel problem ( 1.1) as k → ∞.
Proof. By the assumption, the equilibrium bifunction f k is upper -semicontiniuos with respect to the first argument and lower semicontinuous, convex with respect to the second argument on C. Then, by Corollary 2.2, f k is uniformly coercive on C. Thus Problem P EP (C, f k ) is solvable and, for all k > 0, the solution-sets of these problems are contained in a compact set B. So any infinite sequence {x k } of the solutions has a cluster point, say,x. Without lost of generality, we may assume that
For any z ∈ S g , we have g(z, y) ≥ 0 ∀y ∈ C, particularly, g(z, x k ) ≥ 0. Then, by the pseudomonotonicity of g, we have g(x k , z) ≤ 0. Replacing y by z in (1) we obtain
To complete the proof, we need only to show thatx ∈ S g . Indeed, for any y ∈ C we have g(
Again, by upper semicontiniuity of f and g we obtain in the limit, as k → 0, that g(x, y) ≥ 0 ∀y ∈ C. Hencex ∈ S g . On the other hand, from the assumption on g the solution-set S g of the lower equilibrium EP (C, g) is a closed, convex, compact set. Since f is lower semicontinuous and convex with respect to the second argument and is strongly monotone on C, the upper equilibrium problem EP (S g , f ) has a unique soultion. By the first part of this theorem, this unique solution much be the limit point of any sequence {x k } with x k being a solution to the penalized problem P EP (C, f k ).
2 Remark 2.2 In a special case considered in [18] , where both f and g are monotone, the penalized problem (PEP) is monotone too. In this case (PEP) can be solved by some existing methods (see. e.g. [16, 17, 18, 21, 22, 24] ) and the references therein. However, when one of these two bifunctions is pseudomonotone, the penalized problem (PEP). in general, does not inherit any monotonicity property from f and g. In this case, Problem (PEP) cannot be solved by the aboe mentioned existing methods.
Gap Function and Descent Direction
A well-known tool for solving equilibrium problem is the gap function. The regularized gap function has been introduced by Fukushima and Taji in [23] for variational inequalities, and extended by Mastroeni in [16] to equilibrium problems. In this section we use the regularized gap function for the penalized equilibrium problem (PEP). As we have mentioned above, this problem, even when g is pseudomonotone and f is strongly monotone is still difficult to solve.
Throughout this section we suppose that both f and g are lower semicontinuous, convex on C with respect to the second argument. First we recall (see e.g. [16] ) the definition of a gap function for the equilibrium problem.
is a solution for (PEP).
A gap function for (PEP) is ϕ(x) = − min y∈C f (x, y). This gap function may not be finite and, in general, is not differentiable. To obtain a finite, differentiable gap function, we use the regularized gap function introduced in [23] and recently is used by Matroeni in [16] to equilibrium problems. From Proposition 2.2 and Theorem 2.1 in [16] the following proposition is immediate.
Proposition 3.1 Suppose that l : C × C → R is a nonnegative differentiable, strongly convex bifunction on C with respect to the second argument and satisfies a) l(x, x) = 0 ∀x ∈ C b) ∇ y l(x, x) = 0 ∀x ∈ C. Then the function
is a finite gap function for (PEP). In addition, if f and g are differentiable with respect to the first argument and ∇ x f (x, y), ∇ x g(x, y) are continuous on C, then ϕ (x) is continuously differentiable on C and
and y (x) = arg min y∈C {g (x, y)}.
Note that, the function l(x, y) := M (y − x), y − x , where M is a symmetric positive definite matrix of order n satisfies the assumptions on l.
We need some definitions on ∇-monotonicity. Definition 3.2 A differentiable bifunction h : C × C → R is called: a) strongly ∇-monotone on C if there exists a constant τ > 0 such that:
d)strictly pseudo ∇-monotone on C if ∇ x h(x, y), y − x ≤ 0 =⇒ ∇ y h(x, y), y − x > 0 ∀x, y ∈ C and x = y; e) pseudo ∇-monotone on C if
Remark 3.1 The definitions a), b), c) can be found, for example, in [4, 16] . The definitions d) and e), to our best knowledges, are not used before. From the definitions we have
However, c) may not imply d) and vice versa as shown by the following simple examples.
Example 3.1 Consider the bifunction h(x, y) = e x 2 (y 2 −x 2 ) defined on C ×C with C = R. This bifunction is not ∇-monotone on C, because
is negative for x = −1, y = 3. However, h(x, y) is strictly pseudo ∇-monotone. Indeed, we have
It is not difficult to verify that
Hence this function is strictly pseudo ∇-monotone, but it is not ∇-monotone Vice versa, consider the bifunction h(x, y) = (y − x) T M (y − x) defined on R n × R n , where M is a matrix of order n × n. We have:
Clearly, h is not strictly ∇-monotone. ii) h is strictly pseudo ∇-monotone. iff
The latter inequality is equivalent to M + M T is a positive definite matrix of order n × n. [4] that when h(x, y) = T (x), y−x with T differentiable monotone operator on C, then h is monotone on C if and only if T is monotone on C, and in this case monotonicity of h on C coincides with ∇-monotonicity of h on C.
Remark 3.2 As shown in
The following example shows that pseudomonotonicity may not imply pseudo ∇-monotonicity.
Thus h is pseudomonotone on R + We have
So h is not pseudo ∇-monotone on R + .
From the definition of the gap function ϕ , a global minimal point of this function over C is a solution to Problem (PEP). Since ϕ is not convex, its a global minimum is extremely difficult to compute. In [4] the authors shown that under the strict ∇-monotonicity a stationary point is also a global minimum of gap function. By an counter-example, the authors in [4] also pointed out that the strict ∇-monotonicity assumption can not be relaxed to ∇-monotonicity. The following theorem shows that the stationary property is still guaranteed under the strict pseudo ∇-monotonicity. Theorem 3.1 Suppose that g is strictly pseudo ∇-monotone on C. Ifx is a stationary point of ϕ over C i.e.
∇ϕ (x), y −x ≥ 0 ∀y ∈ C.
Thenx solves (PEP).
Proof. Suppose thatx does not solve (PEP). Then y (x) =x.
Sincex is a stationary point of ϕ on C, from the defition of ϕ , we have
By strict pseudo ∇-monotonicity of g , it follows that
On the other hand, since y (x) minimizes g (x, .) over C, we have
which is conflicts with (1). 2
To computing a stationary point of a differentiable function over a closed convex set, we can use the existing descent direction algorithms in mathematical programming (see, e.g.. [3] , [4] ). The next proposition shows that if y(x) is a solution of the problem min y∈C g (x, y), then y(x) − x is a descent direction on C of ϕ at x. Namely, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 3.2 Suppose that g is strictly pseudo ∇-monotone on C and x is not a solution to Problem (PEP), then
which, by strict pseudo∇-monotonicity of g , implies
On the other hand, since y (x) minimizes g (x, .) over C, by the well-known optimality condition, we have
Proposition 3.3 Suppose that g(x, .) is strictly convex on C for every x ∈ C and g is strictly pseudo ∇-monotone on C. If x ∈ C is not a solution of (PEP) then there exists¯ > 0 such that y (x) − x is a descent direction of ϕ on C at x for all 0 < ≤¯ .
Proof, By contradiction, suppose that the statement of the proposition does not hold. Then there exists k 0 and x ∈ C such that
Since g (x, .) is strictly convex differentiable on C, by Theorem 2.1 in [7] , the function → y (x) is continuous with respect to . Thus y k (x) tends to y 0 (x) as k → 0, where y 0 (x) = argmin y∈C g(x, y).
By strict pseudo ∇ -monotonicity of g k , it follows
On the other hand, since y k (x) minimizes g k (x, .) over C, we have
Taking the limit we obtain ∇ y g(x, y 0 (x)), y 0 (x) − x ≤ 0, which contradicts to (2) . 2 To illustrate Theorem 3.1, let us consider the following examples Example 3.3 Consider the bifunctions g(x, y) = e x 2 (y 2 − x 2 ) and f (x, y) = 10
It is not hard to verify that: i) g(x, y), f (x, y) are monotone, strictly pseudo ∇-monotone on R ii) ∀ > 0 the bifunction g(x, y) + f (x, y) is monotone and strictly pseudo ∇-monotone on R and satisfying all of the assumptions of Theorem 3.1.
Example 3.4 Let f (x, y) = −x 2 −xy +2y 2 and g(x, y) = −3x 2 y +xy 2 +2y 3 defined on R + × R + it is easy to see that:
i) g, f are pseudomonotone, strictly ∇-monotone on R + ii) ∀ > 0 the bifunction g(x, y) + f (x, y) is pseudomonotone and strictly ∇-monotone on R + and satisfying all of the assumptions of Theorem 3.1
Application to the Tikhonov Regularization Method
The Tikhonov method [2] is commonly used for handling ill-posed problems. Recently, in [10] the Tikhonov method has been extended to the pseudomonotone equilibrium problem:
where, as before, C is a closed convex set in R n and g : C → R is a pseudo monotone bifunction satisfying g(x, x) = 0 for every x ∈ C.
In the Tikhonov regularization method considered in [10] , Problem EP (C, g) is regularized by the problems
where f is an equilibrium bifunction on C and > 0, which plays as the regularization bifunction and regularization parameter, respectively. In [10] the following theorem has been proved.
Theorem 4.1 Suppose that f (., y), g(., y) are upper semicontinuous and lower semicontinuous convex on C for each x, y ∈ C and that g is pseudomonotone on C. Suppose further that f is strongly monotone on C satisfying the condition
where x g ∈ C is given (plays as a guess-solution).
Then the following three statements are equivalent: a) The solution-set of EP (C, g ε ) is nonempty for each ε > 0 and lim ε→0 + x(ε) exists, where x(ε) is arbitrarily chosen in the solution-set of EP (C, g ε ).
b) The solution-set of EP (C, g ε ) is nonempty for each ε > 0 and lim ε→0 + sup x(ε) < ∞, where x(ε) is arbitrarily chosen in the solution-set of EP (C, g ε ).
c) The solution-set of EP (C, g) is nonempty. Moreover, if any one of these statements holds, then lim ε→0 + x(ε) is equal to the unique solution of the strongly monotone equilibrium problem EP (S g , f ), where S g denotes the solution-set of the original problem EP (C, g).
Note that, when g is monotone on C, the regularized subproblems are strongly monotone and therefore they can be solved by some existing methods. When g is pseudomonotone, the subproblems, in general, are no longer strongly monotone, monotone, even not pseudomonotone, solving them becomes a difficult task. However, the problem of finding the limit point of the sequences of iterates leads to the unique solution of Problem EP (S g , f ).
In order to apply the penalty and gap function methods described in the preceding sections, let us take, for instant,
Clearly, f is both strongly monotone and strongly ∇-monotone with the same modulus 1. Moreover, f satisfies the condition ( 4.1). Therefore, the problem of finding the limit point in the above Tikhonov regularization method can be formulated as the bilevel equilibrium problem Find x ∈ S g such that f (x * , y) ≥ 0 ∀y ∈ S g , (4.2)
which is of the form ( 1.1). Now, for each fixed k > 0, we consider the penalized equilibrium problem P EP (C, f k ) defined as
Findx k ∈ C such that f k (x k , y) := g(x k , y) + k f (x k , y) ≥ 0 ∀y ∈ C. (4.3)
As before, by SOL(C, f k ) we denote the solution-set of P EP (C, f k ).
Applying Theorems 2.2 and Theorem 3.1 we obtain the following result.
Theorem 4.2 Suppose that bifunction g satisfies the following conditions i) g(x, .) is convex, lower-semicontinuous ∀x ∈ C. ii) g is pseudomonotone and coercive on C. Then for any k > 0 the penalized problem P EP (C, f k ) is solvable and any sequence {x k } with {x k } ∈ SOL(C, f k ) converges to the unique solution of the problem ( 4.2) as k → ∞.
iii) In addition, if g(x, y) + k f (x, y) is strictly pseudo ∇-monotone on C (in particular, g(x, y) is ∇-monotone), andx k is any stationary point of the mathematical program min x∈C ϕ k (x) with ϕ k (x) := min y∈C {g(x, y) + k f (x, y)}.
then, {x k } converges to the unique solution of the problem ( 4.2) as k → ∞.
Conclusion.
We have considered a class of bilevel pseudomonotne equilibrium problems. The main difficulty of this problem is that its feasible domain is not given explicitly as in a standard mathematical programming problem. We have proposed a penalty function method to convert the bilevel problem into one-level ones. Then we have applied the regularized gap function method to solve the penalized equilibrium subproblems. We have generalized the pseudo ∇-monotonicity concept from ∇-monotonicity. Under the pseudo ∇-monotonicity property, we have proved that any stationary point of the gap function is a solution to the original bilevel problem. As an application we have shown how to apply the proposed method to the Tikhonov regularization method for pseudomonotone equilibrium problems.
